And indeed he [al-Maʾmūn] had the oath of allegiance taken for his son al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn as heir apparent (walī al-ʿahd) after him and he delegated responsibility for Iraq to him; and when he died he was on the River Budandūn 3 along with his brother Abū Isḥāq, Muḥammad b. Hārūn al-Muʿtaṣim bi-llah. And he called the senior commanders and soldiers to join him and he called them to swear allegiance to him and they paid allegiance to him. And so he left from Tarsus until he arrived at the City of Peace. He then entered it and removed (deposed) alʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn from it (the throne) and defeated him. The [important] people (al-nās) swore allegiance to him in it. And his arrival in Baghdad was at the beginning of the month of Ramadan of the year 218 (mid-September, 833). And so he stayed there two years and then moved along with his Turks to surra man raʾā.
With the above account in mind, I would like to explore a two-part hypothesis: first, that Al-Muʿtaṣim with the aid of Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād murdered alMaʾmūn; 5 and second, that the Amorion campaign and subsequent purge of al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and of al-Maʾmūn's generals were the final consolidation of that act.
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The Death of al-Maʾmūn
To elucidate the support for this hypothesis, let us now turn to the last five years of al-Maʾmūn's reign. 7 In 213/828 the Caliph placed his son al-ʿAbbās in charge of the frontier provinces bordering the Byzantines, apparently preparing him for the succession.
8 By 215/830, without supplanting him, al-Maʾmūn had effectively moved the court closer to the Byzantine frontier where he was on a campaign of conquest. 9 He was not merely engaging in pro forma seasonal raiding, but was intent on capturing and holding a position north of the Cilician Gates. By 216/831, Ṭuwāna/ Tyana was being used as an operational staging site. 10 The campaign of 218/833 was of a similar character. Al-Maʾmūn set off for the Byzantine frontier from Tarsus after having an exchange of letters with the Byzantine Emperor the year before (217). Given the tenor of both letters (as recorded in al-Ṭabarī), al-Maʾmūn was spoiling for a fight.
11 At about the same time, al-ʿAbbās was dispatched to fortify a large installation at Ṭuwāna. 12 It was massive and intended as a permanent foothold. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that the walls had a circumference of three farsakhs, which is between fifteen and twenty kilometers. After having passed through the Cilician Gates on his way to join forces with al-ʿAbbās at Ṭuwāna, al-Maʾmūn paused at the halfway point at Budandūn. 13 While there, al-Maʾmūn died under most suspicious circumstances. According to al-Ṭabarī, while resting he ate some newly arrived dates and became ill.
14 The ruary-March 832) and afterwards "returned to Syria. 13 Budandūn is almost exactly halfway between Tarsus and Ṭuwāna. Al-Ṭabarī said that it was also the name of a river. AlMasʿūdī said that it was a spring that formed a river. Al narrator takes pains to assure the reader that both he and al-Muʿtaṣim ate the dates and became ill at the same time as al-Maʾmūn. 15 Because his death on the frontier was entirely too convenient for al-Muʿtaṣim, the point of the interjection was to obviously and plausibly allay suspicions that al-Maʾmūn was poisoned. Al-Maʾmūn died on Rajab 17, 218/August 10, 833 16 and was buried in Tarsus. 17 It is usually thought that after the disastrous attempt to appoint ʿAlī al-Riḍā as heir, al-Maʾmūn had failed to fill this position until very near the end of his life.
18 Nawas argues that as a result of family pressures, al-Maʾmūn was left little choice but to designate al-Muʿtaṣim as heir. 19 Immediately upon his death, al-Muʿtaṣim became Caliph.
Al-Ṭabarī, among others, tells us that al-ʿAbbās was there when al-Maʾmūn died. 20 Gordon has asserted the entirely reasonable proposition that al-Muʿtaṣim took advantage of the untimely death of a caliph (his brother) to seize control. 21 However, upon closer examination, something else is at work here. Despite being labeled by al-Ṭabarī as an oration, al-Maʾmūn's will is reflective, closely worded, argued and thought out, and not the words of a dying man moving in and out of lucidity.
22 This text deserves closer scrutiny than it has received up to this point. Under the circum-15 Jayyusi-Lehn also notes this. G. Jayyusi-Lehn, "The Caliphate of al-Muʿtaṣim," 112. 16 stances, the will was either composed in advance or ex post facto by someone other than al-Maʾmūn.
Let us consider the latter possibility. The most likely culprit is Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād, especially as he was given such a prominent place and continuing role by the will itself. 23 The secondary literature most often presents him as al-Maʾmūn's deputy, but there is evidence that questions that labeling. Ibn Abī Duʾād and al-Muʿtaṣim had an established working relationship during al-Maʾmūn's reign. During his assignment to al-Muʿtaṣim's camp (215/830-31) in the mission to Egypt, Ibn Abī Duʾād proved himself loyal to al-Muʿtaṣim in defiance of al-Maʾmūn. 24 In Ibn Ḥajar's account, when he was appointed to the maẓālim in al-Muʿtaṣim's camp, Ibn Abī Duʾād was not an important person. Ironically, he was recommended to al-Maʾmūn by Yaḥyā b. Aktham. Ibn Abī Duʾād's prominent role in the Miḥna began during al-Muʿtaṣim's reign. He was not chief judge under al-Maʾmūn; that was a position that he acquired after the latter's death. As all of the later ʿAbbāsid caliphs were descended from al-Muʿtaṣim, there would be little incentive for contemporaries to point out the forgery.
The Will
Let us now examine the will in depth. The first part is relatively uncontroversial, giving prescriptions about burial. 25 However, for the rest of the will, its author conveniently knew what al-Muʿtaṣim would do next, both immediately and over the course of the following 2005), 122. According to Nawas, Jayyusi-Lehn has addressed this in her dissertation, which I have not had a chance to read.
23 El-Hibri, without going into depth, notes some of the provisions of the will, the relationship to Ibn Abī Duʾād, and their almost prescient nature. He states that they were most likely written at the court of al-Muʿtaṣim "at the behest of " Ibn Abī Duʾād. few years. Either al-Muʿtaṣim was a complete slave to his brother's will, or it was written at a later date. 26 We should now go through its provisions point by point; after the burial instructions, there are thirteen of them. First, al-Muʿtaṣim was exhorted to hurry back to Baghdad. 27 All of the sources agree that this is what he did. 28 He entered it on 1 Ramadan 218/30 September 833, about forty days after al-Maʾmūn's death. The will indicates that he had to do this to secure his position. Most sources recount that he left in great haste, with some indicating that he did so in fear of the officers by whom he was surrounded. Those sources say that they were upset that al-ʿAbbās had been passed over and were inclined to pledge their support to him. Al-Muʿtaṣim had to work hard to forestall this possibility. He used the entire forty-day mourning period to march back to Baghdad. Although there is no discussion of mourning rituals, neither is it stated what took so long. The "Fragmenta," which so often is in agreement with al-Ṭabarī's version of events, does not differ much here; where it does differ, however, is intriguing:
He was Abū Isḥāq Muḥammad b. Hārūn alRashīd, and his mother was Mārida and she was an umm walad. The oath of allegiance was taken to him on the day al-Maʾmūn died and he was with him in Tarsus in Rajab of the year 218. [al-Muʿtaṣim] heaped scorn on them and he approached Baghdad on Saturday the first day of Ramadan in the year 218.
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Note that the army continued to clamor even after al-ʿAbbās's statement. It is very interesting that al-ʿAbbās was described as having handed over the Caliphate. This of course implies that he was in possession of it and that it was his to give. 31 Al-Ṭabarī said the exact same thing, with the exception that in his account al-Muʿtaṣim was not fleeing the imperial army in fear for his life.
32 Ibn Aʿtham, also giving much the same information, added that the commanders from whom he was fleeing had accused him of murdering al-Maʾmūn. 33 That he was accused by some of the commanders makes sense of his hurried departure for Baghdad. 34 At the very least, the sources provide compelling circumstantial evidence that al-Maʾmūn was murdered. Ibn al-Ṣābiʾ and Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa both quoted al-Ṣulī's kitāb al-awrāq as saying that al-Muʿtaṣim interfered deliberately in al-Maʾmūn's medical care, leading directly and intentionally to his death. 35 Those sources implicated al-Muʿtaṣim's occasional, but not regular, doctor, Ibn Māsawayh. Given the circumstances and outcome, the culprit and his motives appear obvious. Add to this the discontent registered by the officers and that the purge with which the Amorion campaign was concluded was so complete and severe that there must be a connection between the events. Ibn Qutayba's account is eye-opening:
He is Muḥammad b. Hārūn and he was given the kunya Abū Isḥāq and his mother was Mārida, a slave girl and Abū Isḥāq was with his brother and al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn at the time when he died in the land of the Byzantines. The [important] people (al-nās) wanted to pledge allegiance to al-ʿAbbās but al-ʿAbbās rejected it and ceded to Abū Isḥāq the command [rulership] and then Abū Isḥāq turned his face towards Baghdad quickly and he was fearful for himself about a group of the commanders who were disquieted by him. And thus he arrived at it at the beginning of the month of Ramadan of the year 218/833. He stayed in it two years, then he moved to surra man raʾā in the year 220/835 . . . And then Byzantium attacked Zibaṭra. And so Abū Isḥāq turned his face towards ghazw in Jumāda I of the year 223/838 and he conquered Amorion in the month of Ramadan of this year then after that he made preparations to leave and he fell upon al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and ʿUjayf on his way. He approached surra man raʾā in Dhū al-Hijja of that year. And Ibrāhīm b. alMahdī died in surra man raʾā in the month of Ramadan of the year 224/839 and he gibbeted al-Afshīn in the year 226/840-41. 36 Through context, Ibn Qutayba connected alMuʿtaṣim scurrying back to Baghdad in fear for his life to the raid on Amorion. Given the distance, something around forty days is hardly scurrying quickly. As well, Ibn Qutayba made no mention of a coup attempt. He merely stated that al-Muʿtaṣim assaulted al-ʿAbbās and ʿUjayf b. ʿAnbasa without giving an explicit reason why. 37 However, his phrasing and connective clausing draws a line between the succession, the assault and the expiration of troublesome, yet powerful individuals. The reader is led to infer that al-Muʿtaṣim did this because the officers wanted to swear loyalty to al-ʿAbbās instead of him and they continued to do so after his renouncing it. In the end, al-ʿAbbās, it seems, in an effort to avoid another civil war, opted to bide his time and take the oath of allegiance.
38 He was also faced with the problem that while he had arrived on the scene in time for his father's death, he had done so largely unaccompanied by the bulk of his forces who had remained in Ṭuwāna. This would have given alMuʿtaṣim significant leverage over him but would not have extirpated residual support for al-ʿAbbās. This also explains the next point in the will.
The second provision of the will was that, with reference to the Byzantines, al-Muʿtaṣim should "be mindful/wary of these people in whose front yard you are and so do not ignore them at any time." 39 The destruction of the fortifications under construction at Ṭuwāna and the removal of its colonists was alMuʿtaṣim's first act as Caliph. 40 Al-Azdī and al-Ṭabarī agree that he did this before heading for Baghdad. This would make sense of the forty-day journey from Tarsus to Baghdad. As noted above, al-ʿAbbās b. alMaʾmūn, under orders from his father, had been fortifying the town and settling new residents in it. It served as a forward base of operations but was more than a mere hilltop-outpost. Significant investment had been made to insure that it was added permanently to the Caliphate. Al-Muʿtaṣim's destruction of it and the removal of all weaponry could be interpreted as an effort to pull back from an exposed position leaving nothing usable for the enemy. Or, equally likely, it could be interpreted as the destruction of a possible base of operations for a powerful ʿAbbāsid rival to whom many in the military leadership wished to swear allegiance.
Note that Ṭuwāna was not as exposed a forward position as is often asserted. In 216/831 there were a series of very successful raids originating from there deep into Byzantine territory. 41 Thus it was under continuous occupation and had been for some time. 38 Al-Dhahabī said that ʿAbbās was the first to take the oath to al-Muʿtaṣim. This supports the contention that al-Maʾmūn ordered al-ʿAbbās to reinforce and strengthen an already existing emplacement. At the same time that he ordered al-ʿAbbās to fortify and expand it, al-Maʾmūn levied troops from Syria and Egypt. A large number of men were placed under al-ʿAbbās' command with him in Ṭuwāna. 42 Al-ʿAbbās was modifying the fortifications to accommodate the addition of this new larger contingent on a permanent basis. Though forward and more exposed than other areas, when al-ʿAbbās was given this task, the fort had been operational for some time. As such, it was unlikely to have been in any greater danger from the Byzantines at the death of al-Maʾmūn than before, particularly since a massive force was already garrisoned there in preparation for an intended assault towards Constantinople. 43 Given the description of the number of troops, one easily infers that this was to be an expedition of the same size if not larger than the one that al-Muʿtaṣim made against Amorion. Three months before he died, al-Maʾmūn set his son up in a fortified position with a large army. The army would gain experience, and al-ʿAbbās would gain renown in what was going to be a major expedition against the Byzantines. Al-ʿAbbās would have strengthened his hand in establishing himself as a legitimate ruler and continuator of his father's policies (of course, not reckoning that his death was imminent). His credentials as a military commander and ghazi Caliph would be secured. Al-Muʿtaṣim would need these credentials as well, and would pursue a similar course of action to attain them. Given the circumstances of al-Muʿtaṣim's ascension to the throne, taking this opportunity away from al-ʿAbbās was of paramount importance. 44 While primogeniture was not the established mechanism for inheritance of leadership, almost every prior Caliph, when able to express his wishes concerning succession, indicated a preference for his own son. Succession by a brother was not by any means anomalous but neither was it a foregone conclusion. Clearly 42 Ibid., iii, 1111-12. al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 412 indicated that all of them were sent with al-ʿAbbās to Ṭuwāna. 43 Al-Yaʿqūbī also mentioned that Amorion, as it was on the way, was also a target of this mission. al-Maʾmūn was establishing a rivalry between the two main contenders for the throne. 45 Given recent precedents, al-Muʿtaṣim must have discerned the prospects of being sidelined. As Nawas points out, both al-ʿAbbās and al-Muʿtaṣim were equally qualified for succession.
46 That al-Muʿtaṣim was older does not necessarily mean that he had an edge; consider alManṣūr's succession struggle with his uncle ʿAbdallāh and the sidelining of ʿĪsā b. Mūsā.
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Now we turn to the third and fourth provisions of the will. Al-Muʿtaṣim was told to pursue Bābak and the Khurramiyya, along with a description of the type of commander for the task. Al-Afshīn is not named, but the description given applies well to both him and his behavior on that campaign. The will also specifies the behavior of the Caliph. It is a suspiciously prescient account of how both al-Afshīn and al-Muʿtaṣim would conduct themselves in the course of the campaign. This argues for a dating of the forgery of the will to the period after al-Maʾmūn's death and before al-Afshīn's disgrace in 225/839.
Fifth, the will warned that "exhortation" must be backed up by action. Al-Muʿtaṣim would have to follow the same path as his brother to prove his credentials, but it was vital that he brought them to a successful conclusion. As no specific target was mentioned, nor was glorious victory predicted (as with the above concerning the Khurramiyya), this helps to confirm my dating of the document and narrows it even further to a point before the launch of the Amorion campaign.
At this point there is a break in the will, which notes that al-Maʾmūn's condition worsened and he summoned his brother to his bedside. This serves the purpose of signaling that the designation of his brother as heir was in place and not the product of a deathbed pronouncement. The narrative in al-Ṭabarī explicitly places the first half of the will chronologically while alMaʾmūn was still alive and al-Muʿtaṣim was elsewhere. The interjection seems to address the legal problem that one could not issue or even make changes to a will from the deathbed. 48 If he issued the proclamation and then promptly died, the missive would have been 45 invalid. Summoning al-Muʿtaṣim underscores that alMaʾmūn had made his designation well in advance of his death throes. 49 Al-Ṭabarī explicitly says this before recounting the text of the will.
Addressing the deathbed issue at this point introduces a problem for points six through thirteen, which follow the interjection. These could be later interpolations that solved the deathbed issue, while also accounting for al-Mutawakkil's actions regarding Ibn Abī Duʾād and a continuing concern over the independent position of the Ṭāhirids. 50 But, given that it was the will of a Caliph, a document publicly used to validate the claim of the presiding Caliph, how likely is it that such a visible emendation would have left no other traces? It is more likely that it was a device to attest to the authenticity of the will.
The sixth provision chided al-Muʿtaṣim to be just, so that the change in succession was justified "as I have transferred it from other than you to you." 51 Bosworth in his translation glosses "it" as meaning "[the Messenger of God's protection]" whereas I read this as an acknowledgement that al-ʿAbbās had already been declared walī al-ʿahd as al-Dīnawarī asserted. 52 To affirm the orality and thus the authenticity of the document, al-Muʿtaṣim interrupted the dying Caliph to say that he would do as he had been told.
Continuing with the seventh point, al-Muʿtaṣim was told to rely on ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir. My assessment is that this is merely what it purports to be, an exhortation not to jumble the power structure of the state. Of course, al-Muʿtaṣim would do just that on the Amorion campaign; but the author of the will appeared not to know that. The eighth point seems to confirm my reading of the previous, that al-Muʿtaṣim should rely on the Ṭāhirid Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm as his lieutenant, which he also would. Isḥāq was an ally of Ibn Abī Duʾād and would maintain his position at the center of power until his death in 235/850. 53 For the ninth point, al-Muʿtaṣim was admonished that the ʿAbbāsid family was not qualified for much 49 and that he should avoid them. The will told him that he could rely on only one somewhat obscure member of the family and to appoint him (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb) as its leader.
54 This is what one would expect from alMaʾmūn but not from al-Muʿtaṣim's coterie, as they represented, in effect, a rapprochement within the ʿAbbāsid family. 55 Ironically, al-Muʿtaṣim did in the end take this advice, as he became increasingly more reliant on his personal force, the Turkish guard.
In the tenth provision, very famously he was told to keep Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād close and to put his trust in him. Many have mistaken this to be an explicit admonishment to continue the Miḥna, which it was not. Ibn Abī Duʾād was not yet identified as the leader of the Miḥna. Tellingly, this is his first appearance in al-Ṭabarī's chronicle. Of the four named figures in the will that al-Muʿtaṣim was told to rely upon, Ibn Abī Duʾād was the only one in a position to author the will. The following point helps to substantiate this.
The eleventh point of the will said to choose a good Vizier. This is tantalizing, yet problematic, because it was immediately followed by point twelve, in which contemporaneous readers. Thus these must have been two separate provisions, but one is left with the unsettling perception that perhaps they were not.
And finally point thirteen: be kind to the ʿAlids. It was a general admonishment without any specific recommendations and was to be expected from alMaʾmūn. The text of the will then moved to its conclusion with a quote from the Qurʾān (3:102). It is odd that, for a man obsessed with the Qurʾān (compare to al-Maʾmūn's Miḥna letters), this was the only reference to scripture in the whole of the document. Al-Muʿtaṣim was told to "fear God" and rule as a good Muslim. The text ends with a plea for the forgiveness of al-Maʾmūn's sins. Next at the age of forty-eight or forty-nine years old 58 he died, and al-ʿAbbās and alMuʿtaṣim took the body to Tarsus for burial. Al-Ṭabarī and al-Yaʿqūbī both reported that al-Muʿtaṣim and not al-ʿAbbās prayed over him.
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The Background to the Will
To elucidate the implications of the will, let us turn to the broader context for this succession. The war between the brothers al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn (194-198/809-813) had caused a severe breakdown in the authority of the center. An important repercussion of this war for the dynasty was the dramatic rift within the ʿAbbāsid family itself that left al-Maʾmūn bereft of meaningful familial support.
60 After al-Maʾmūn had won the war, but before he returned to the capital in 204/819, the elite of the capital, including his family members, seriously misbehaved. Their behavior improved slightly in his presence, but al-Maʾmūn became increasingly reliant on those who had come from Marw with him, most visibly Ṭāhir b. al-Husayn and his kin. Of the ʿAbbāsids, the only one that he seems to have relied on and to have received important support and help from was his younger brother, Abū Isḥāq, the future al-Muʿtaṣim. Ismāʿīl al-Bilī asserts that, as alMuʿtaṣim was not part of the factional politics of their father's court and not really of the faction of al-Amīn, this must have made him an attractive supporter for al- 58 This, in an interesting parallel, was roughly the same age at which his father, his brother al-Muʿtaṣim, and his nephew al-Mutawakkil would die. Al-Wāthiq would die before the age of forty, confirming the trend of early death in the family. 59 al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1140. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 429. 60 For more see Nawas, "All in the Family?"
Maʾmūn. 61 He goes on to argue that al-Muʿtaṣim was al-Maʾmūn's "right hand man," and that this does not seem to have provoked a rivalry between al-ʿAbbās and his uncle. From this he extrapolates that the issue of succession did not arise between the two, as everyone was too busy. I find this hard to accept. Succession struggles were the defining narrative for all of the Caliphs from the beginning. Al-Muʿtaṣim was essential to al-Maʾmūn's plans-but then again, so were al-ʿAbbās, the Ṭāhirids, and al-Maʾmūn's other generals.
Another important consequence of the fourth fitna was the profoundly negative effect it had on the stability and discipline of the army. The imperial army of the metropole had been defeated and al-Maʾmūn's new army (with elements of the old) had stepped into its place but could not do so completely. 62 He tried his best to co-opt the abnāʾ al-dawla but was reluctant, with good reason, to rely on them. The years 204-218/819-833 were a period of reconstruction and reconsolidation of the empire. Thus, the bulk of al-Maʾmūn's reign was engaged in restoring control. 63 It was mostly successful except in regards to the ʿAbbāsid family and with a few trouble spots like Bābak's Khurramiyya.
Thus 218/833 would have been a propitious time for al-Muʿtaṣim to remove al-Maʾmūn. The disruptions had abated enough so that al-Muʿtaṣim could stage a coup without worrying about destroying the whole empire. Upon winning the war against al-Amīn, one of the first things that al-Maʾmūn had to do was to make his army into an imperial army. 64 Al-Maʾmūn's army under Ṭāhir was strong enough to set about restoring order and reintegrating the Caliphate, but he needed others to avoid becoming too dependent on any one general. One need only recall the position of Abū Muslim to recognize the predicament. For this, he turned to his brother who had been actively creating a private guard of servile origins. Given the chaos of Baghdad from the siege until al-Maʾmūn's arrival seven years later in 204/819, this was likely initially a private bodyguard prudently hired for protection during an almost total breakdown of law and order. This force would, in time, grow, but would never be very large. Ītākh, Waṣīf and Ashinās, the top rank of the first generation of the Samarran elite, were purchased at this time. It is important to note that this was not a proper army of the imperium, nor was it intended to be. Al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that al-Muʿtaṣim had 3,000 slave soldiers (ghilman) by the end of al-Maʾmūn's reign. 65 While large, this was his personal guard and not a field army. Ultimately, it reinforced his power over a ruling elite who would never organize effectively enough to defeat or eliminate them.
Gordon has argued that at first these soldiers were somewhat ceremonial. 66 For example, upon entering Baghdad for the first time as Caliph, al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that al-Muʿtaṣim equipped his guard with "gilded silk brocade," 67 thus marking them off as special. While their "ceremonial" purpose can be debated, alMuʿtaṣim had had some success against the kharijites as Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī's agent during the chaos of Baghdad at the beginning of al-Maʾmūn's reign, but his troops had not really been tested. Being chosen by Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī for that task indicates nothing more than that he had a moderately organized force in a time when there were few of those at hand.
In 214/829-830, al-Muʿtaṣim was sent to Egypt to put down a rebellion for al-Maʾmūn. 68 He did so, but the province erupted in revolt once again in the next year and al-Maʾmūn had to go personally; with the aid of al-Afshīn, he restored order. 69 This, in itself, was hardly an unusual occurrence; however, one could draw the inference that al-Muʿtaṣim's troops were neither dominant nor numerous enough to operate in two theaters simultaneously. This is the reason why: at the beginning of his own reign, these troops were 65 71 In that campaign, they were deployed in a position clearly subordinate to al-Afshīn. They also come across as roundly and dangerously incompetent. Al-Muʿtaṣim's army did not appear to be that formidable in contrast to that of ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir, ʿUjayf, and al-Afshīn. 72 If one considers this description, then why al-Muʿtaṣim did not move against al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn, his supporters, and al-Maʾmūn's men immediately upon his rise to the throne is quite obvious. His guard did not have the prestige to be the dominant elite of the army of the Caliph. In addition, al-Muʿtaṣim was dependent on his brother's former generals to preserve the stability of the Empire. His Turkish guard was faced with competitors, such as al-Afshīn, who were effective and competent, yet politically suspect. Both ʿUjayf and al-Afshīn would be disgraced, humiliated and then executed shortly after their triumph and glory. The Ṭāhirids would prove to be too useful and entrenched for this treatment.
73
The Amorion Campaign and the Purge Ironically, coming roughly halfway through his reign, the Amorion campaign established al-Muʿtaṣim as a ghazi caliph. The campaign and the subsequent purge more firmly brought the Caliphate under his control. We know more about the campaign against Amorion than practically any other. 74 We also find it glorified 70 Gordon speculates that Bughā's abysmal performance could explain "why the Turkish guard was kept in Iraq. . ." Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 76. 71 al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1171-82, 1187-1234. 72 Ayalon notes that in spite of generally unimpressive results, the mamlūk troops were preferred for their "military superiority;" he is certainly correct, and the position of Ītākh and Bughā highlight this; Ayalon, "Military Reforms," 25. 73 Given the hints and allegations surrounding al-Afshīn that he was after the Ṭāhirid domains, perhaps with some encouragement from the court, it is not a far reach to suspect that such a gambit was in the offing but proved unsuccessful with al-Afshīn bearing the full brunt of retribution for the failure. 74 It is interesting that al-Afshīn's campaign against Bābak is the other campaign that we know the most about. In fact, al-Ṭabarī in Abū Tammām's famous Qaṣīda. 75 One problem with all of that is that the campaign really was not worthy of the accolades. It was a relatively minor and fleeting victory. It received such notice because of the internal propaganda value it yielded for the Caliph. It provided "proof " that the Caliph was a legitimate ghazi, or at the very least as legitimate as his brother and more so than his nephew. It also proved that his Turks were a capable and competent field army and not just a personal guard. Al-Afshīn, in spite of having met, fought and defeated the Byzantine Emperor on his way to Ankara, was virtually ignored in the account as a battlefield commander. 76 The campaign on Amorion, despite its minimal impact, was a major logistical operation. It began in 223/838 with a great deal of preparation. Al-Afshīn was in charge of the northern prong of a prolonged pincers movement converging first on Ankara and then Amorion. Al-Muʿtaṣim with Ītākh and Ashinās commanded the southern prong. The attack did not necessarily go as planned, but in the end Amorion was taken after a relatively short siege.
The turn of events after this point, as related by al-Ṭabarī, is confused. It is a strange and sordid tale indeed and one that stretches credulity. The narrative comes to a head with al-ʿAbbās getting drunk with the Caliph and naming names of his supporters who had planned to kill al-Muʿtaṣim and his Turkish generals, so that they then could be arrested and executed. 77 Those who had been fingered, along with al-ʿAbbās himself, were shackled and each was killed in a creative manner. Among these, ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās were given very salty food while water was withheld. They subsequently died of dehydration, which in al-ʿAbbās's case was hurried along by being wrapped in a felt blanket in the heat of the day. 78 ʿUjayf was executed by the Ṭāhirid Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, while al-Afshīn personally dispatched al-ʿAbbās. Having them die of thirst instead of by other means left no visible marks of abuse. This choice was not an indicator of status but of an interest in covering the tracks of the executioners. This provided them with plausible deniability, but more importantly protected those who carried out the orders from prosecution for that killing: they might be held responsible for neglect but not for murder. 79 Al-Muʿtaṣim went so far as to have al-ʿAbbās's four brothers by his mother Sundus imprisoned by Ītākh. 80 They died of unspecified causes in his basement. As for the others, ʿAmr al-Farghānī was beaten severely and then buried alive; 81 Al-Shāh b. Sahl was decapitated; and Ahmad b. al-Khalīl was thrown into a pit in Samarra as a prison that, after some time, his jailors (under orders) tried to fill with water. 82 It did not work because the ground absorbed all of the water, so they had to take him out. The manner of his death is not recorded, but as it took a number of days, one is safe in assuming that it probably took the same form as the murders of ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās.
In addition, an unnamed Turk killed himself with a knife smuggled into his prison. 83 This, along with the note that Turks were among the unnamed officers purged, raises an important point that the limiting factor was not ethnicity. 84 This was a purge of al-Maʾmūn's supporters, neither only al-ʿAbbās's nor only the non-Turkish elements. 85 According to al- 78 However, al-Dhahabī in his brief note for al-ʿAbbās stated that he died in the year 224 after having gone into rebellion in 223. alDhahabī, Taʾrīkh, volume for the years 221-30, 217. He repeated al-Ṭabarī's version with the information about the coup. Interestingly he did not include it in the Siyar. Al-Azdī says that al-ʿAbbās was killed at Manbij and then ʿUjayf after him. al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 427. They were killed at the same time when safely away from the frontier. Al-Masʿūdī barely mentioned that al-MuʿtaṣimṬabarī, there were two cases of clemency and one case of state's evidence. Al-Hārith al-Samarqandī was one of the original plotters, but was spared because he bore witness against al-ʿAbbās. 86 Harthama b. Naḍr alKhuttalī lived through the intercession of al-Afshīn. 87 We see nothing more of him in this source. The other, al-Sindī b. Bukhtāsha, had his name cleared after his arrest.
88 This is last we hear of him, as well. The Fragmenta tells us that seventy were killed in all. 89 By any calculus, the purge was massive. In spite of its size, we should note that even when al-Muʿtaṣim did make his move in initiating it, he only pursued some of the high-ranking officers and not their subordinates. 90 The rank-and-file stood by and let it happen because they were paid generously and were flush with the booty of Amorion. Al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that al-ʿAbbās had 116,000 dinars with him when he was arrested. 91 Presumably this was to pay for the plot. Al-Muʿtaṣim confiscated the money and then distributed it among the troops. Each soldier received two dinars with the Caliph resolving a shortfall out of his own pocket. One can never really know for sure, but as al-Ṭabarī tells it, the narrative was very convenient for al-Muʿtaṣim's purposes.
It also makes sense. As these events took place on the frontier, no one in the capital was in a position to gainsay it and those who survived the purge had little incentive to. In addition, eliminating officers after the troops had been well-paid and were on their way home was less likely to have sparked a revolt than at some other point. Gordon interprets the purge of the coup plotters and the removal of al-Afshīn as leaving a vacuum that the Turkish guards were left to fill. This it did. However, given the events of the succession and the contrivances in the narrative of the purge, it is not a stretch to say that al-Muʿtaṣim created the vacuum on purpose and that its focus was not merely to promote the Turkish guard but also to break the them all." Ismāʿīl al-Bīlī, Prelude to the Generals, [84] [85] The first thing one notes about Ibn Khayyat's account is the jumbling of events, that Ankara was captured after Amorion. The details but not this order are well-attested elsewhere. However, there is something more important missing. He mentions neither a coup attempt nor succession troubles of any sort. 93 Granted, his account is generally sparse, but one would expect such a major occurrence to make an appearance. Remember also that Ibn Qutayba's account mentioned 92 al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh, 316-17. 93 Ibid., 315. In his note for the end of al-Maʾmūn's reign, he merely mentioned the date of al-Maʾmūn's death without any reference to al-ʿAbbās at all. Also al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh, 317. a purge of ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās but no plot. 94 As well, al-Dīnawarī mentioned neither plot nor purge nor raid on Amorion. While this evidence is not ironclad proof, it does raise significant doubts as to whether al-ʿAbbās had really been plotting. Kennedy has noted that the narrator al-Ṭabarī used for the Amorion campaign intently wanted to "justify" the purge of al-ʿAbbās and his supporters. 95 Elsewhere, he had written that the narrative sought to bolster al-Muʿtaṣim's army, to "stress their competence and loyalty, in contrast to the followers of al-ʿAbbās who are shown as undermining the military effort." 96 Perhaps al-ʿAbbās was plottingand there is significant evidence for this-but whether he was or not, this served as a convenient pretext for clearing the decks of the "old guard," those who had supported al-Maʾmūn. By killing al-ʿAbbās and his brothers, he eliminated the potential for a Maʾmūnid restoration. 97 This in turn argues that whether or not there was a real plot is almost irrelevant to the fact that a purge was inevitable. Al-Muʿtaṣim did not want to upset the recentralization that had been achieved by al-Maʾmūn after the fourth fitna and thus did not remove al-ʿAbbās immediately upon his succession to the throne; another open civil war, and the situation would have been irretrievable; the entire edifice of the Caliphate would have been rent asunder.
Conclusions and Tying Up Loose Ends
The Amorion campaign and the subsequent purge resolved two lingering issues left over from the death of al-Maʾmūn. First was the problem of al-ʿAbbās and those inclined to support him; and second, alMuʿtaṣim's legitimacy as holder of the office of the Caliph. The purge, whether al-ʿAbbās was plotting or not, solved one issue, but it could not be dealt with until the second issue had been resolved; a great and highly publicized victory would do quite nicely. Even if it was not a terribly consequential one, leaving few residual effects in terms of the war with the Byzantines, it was enough to have Abū Tammām's poem ring loudly. The effect of the purge and subsequent removal of al-Afshīn, which assuredly was part of this
